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Abstract	
The	premise	of	this	article	is	that	financial	crises,	whether	they	occur	as	a	result	of	legitimate	
of	 illegitimate	conduct,	 cause	social	harm	and	victimisation.	The	2008	bank	crisis	 is	a	clear	
indication	 of	 this,	 as	 some	 of	 the	 financial	 operations	 determining	 it	 possessed	 a	 criminal	
nature	while	some	did	not.	This	article	is	concerned	with	both	typologies,	namely	with	illicit	
and	 licit	 harmful	 behaviour	 adopted	 by	 financial	 actors.	 After	 some	 general	 introductory	
notes,	the	first	section	of	the	paper	focuses	on	the	measures	proposed	or	adopted	in	response	
to	the	2008	crisis	in	the	UK.	This	is	followed	by	the	presentation	of	a	number	of	recent	cases	
proving	that,	despite	recent	regulatory	efforts,	 large	loopholes	are	still	present	which	allow	
forms	of	financial	crime	to	thrive.	Some	final	observations	on	the	difficulties	encountered	by	
regulatory	attempts	complete	the	paper.	
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Introduction	
The	 contemporary	 financial	 system	 extends	 globally	 and	 penetrates	 all	 social	 and	 natural	
spheres	 (Gallino	 2011).	 It	 has	 been	 described	 as	 a	 mega‐machine	 developed	 over	 the	 last	
decades	 that	 accumulates	 and	maximises,	 in	 the	 form	 of	 capital	 and	 therefore	 of	 power,	 ‘the	
values	 that	 can	 be	 extracted	 from	 the	 highest	 possible	 number	 of	 human	 beings	 and	 echo‐
systems’	 (Gallino	 2011:	 5).	 It	 enjoys	 the	 power	 to	 decide	 what	 has	 to	 be	 produced,	 in	 what	
quantity,	how,	where	and	when.	The	mega‐machine	constituting	industrial	capitalism	had	as	its	
engine	the	manufacture	of	goods,	while	the	financial	system	relies	on	the	production	of	money.	
It	is	controversial	whether	the	predominance	of	the	financial	over	the	productive	sector	follows	
a	 linear	 or	 a	 cyclical	 process,	 namely	 whether	 it	 characterises	 the	 evolution	 of	 market	
economies	in	general	or	successive	phases	thereof	(Arrighi	2009).	What	seems	to	be	constantly	
accompanying	 such	 predominance	 are	 periodical	 crises	 and	 bubbles	 (Bilginsoy	 2015;	
Scheinkman	2014).		
	
The	 first	 component	 of	 the	 financial	 system	 consists	 of	 bank	 holding	 companies,	 which	
simultaneously	 control	 banks	 and	 insurance	 firms,	 offer	 loans,	 and	 sell	 a	 variety	 of	 stocks,	
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derivatives	and	other	products.	The	second	component	is	formed	of	institutional	investors,	who	
mainly	manage	pension	 funds	 and	hedge	 funds.	 Both	 components	 can	 trade	 securities,	which	
include	equities,	bonds,	certificates	of	deposit,	 investment	trusts	and	credit	default	swaps.	The	
third	 component	 is	 constituted	 by	 private	 banks,	 that	 assist	 ‘high	 net	 worth	 individuals’	
(HNWIs)	 and	 provide	 an	 array	 of	 services	 and	 products,	 including	 investment	 management,	
insurance	 and	 consultancy	 in	 cross‐border	 operations.	 ‘Having	 made	 a	 pile	 of	 money,	 most	
HNWIs	spend	most	of	 their	 time	worrying	about	how	not	 to	 lose	 it.	 Private	banks	are	 geared	
towards	 helping	 them	 to	 hang	 on	 to	 it	 and	 grow	 it’	 (Platt	 2015:	 47).	 This	 component	 is	 also	
known	 as	 grey	 or	 shadow	 banking,	 is	 impervious	 to	 regulation	 and	 public	 scrutiny,	 its	
dimension	is	unknown	and	its	balance	sheets	are	far	from	transparent.	The	grey	sector	offers:		
	
…	a	mountain	of	derivatives	which,	for	some	reason,	are	not	budgeted,	is	formed	
of	thousands	of	companies	devoid	of	a	proper	organisational	structure,	are	often	
set	 up	 by	 banks	 solely	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 moving	 revenues	 out	 of	 the	 official	
accounts	(for	this	reason	they	are	also	known	as	vehicles).	(Gallino	2011:	10)	
	
Many	 commentators	 agree	 that	 the	major	 factors	 determining	 the	 2008	 financial	 crisis	were	
financial	engineering	and	rosy	assumptions	concerning	housing	prices	(Scheinkman	2014),	with	
banks	 lending	 money	 to	 borrowers	 and	 then	 selling	 the	 right	 to	 receive	 repayment	 to	 third	
parties	in	the	form	of	credit	default	swaps	(CDSs).	Banks	lent	recklessly	to	borrowers	who	had	
little	ability	 to	repay	(referred	 to	as	 ‘subprime’).	Meanwhile,	 investors	were	 lured	 into	buying	
collateralised	 debt	 obligations	 (CDOs),	 which	 are	 akin	 to	 insurance	 policies,	 guaranteeing	 a	
return	 in	 the	 event	 of	 a	 default	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 original	 mortgage	 borrower.	 ‘Speculators	
(including	 banks)	with	 no	 interest	 in	 the	 underlying	 loans	 began	 to	 buy	 CDSs	 as	 a	means	 of	
betting	on	whether	those	loans	would	be	repaid’	(Platt	2015:	4).		
	
A	frenzy	of	regulatory	proposals	followed	the	2008	crisis,	while	the	basic	question	persistently	
loomed:	can	financial	markets	be	controlled?	A	related	question	is:	will	markets	always	be	one	
step	ahead	of	regulators,	shifting	their	operations	from	one	sector	of	the	system	to	another	and	
from	one	country	to	the	next?	(Davies	2015).	The	 following	outline	of	 the	measures	proposed	
and/or	introduced	in	response	to	the	2008	financial	crisis	sets	the	scene	for	a	tentative	answer	
to	such	questions.		
	
Preventing	future	crises?	
As	mentioned	at	the	beginning,	not	all	 financial	activities	can	be	 labelled	as	criminal,	although	
they	may	be	socially	harmful.	Responses	to	the	crisis,	one	would	assume,	should	be	capable	of	
tackling	 both	 criminal	 and	non‐criminal	 harmful	 activities	 carried	out	 in	 the	 financial	 sphere.	
Let	us	see,	in	the	broad	summary	below,	how	the	authorities	formulated	their	responses.	
	
The	Basel	Committee	
The	 primary	 international	 forum	 for	 the	 co‐ordination	 of	 financial	 regulation	 is	 the	 Basel	
Committee	on	Banking	Supervision,	based	at	 the	Bank	 for	 International	 Settlements	–	 the	 so‐
called	central	bankers’	bank	(Martin	2013).	 In	Basel,	 regulatory	weapons	 to	mitigate	 financial	
hazard	 have	 been	 designed	 in	 the	 past,	 such	 as	 rules	 requiring	 banks	 to	 keep	 a	 specified	
quantity	of	cash	or	highly	liquid	securities	in	their	portfolios.	This	requirement	has	the	function	
of	 a	 tax,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 imposes	 a	 cost	 on	 banks	 that	 decide	 to	 act	 in	 an	 adventurous	
manner.	 It	 is	 like	 the	 tax	 some	would	 like	 to	 impose	on	polluting	 industries.	However,	 in	 the	
financial	 sphere	 all	 rules	 are	 extremely	 difficult	 to	 enforce,	 because	 they	 are	 normally	 non‐
binding	rules.	Moreover,	 some	commentators	would	endorse	 the	argument	 that	all	 regulatory	
measures,	particularly	those	making	banking	operations	more	costly,	have	a	perverse	effect.	 If	
banks	are	required	to	raise	capital	as	a	form	of	guarantee	to	avoid	future	crashes,	the	argument	
goes,	 the	cost	 they	 incur	will	make	 the	crush	even	worse.	This	will	mean	scarcity	of	 liquidity,	
therefore	a	restriction	in	the	ability	of	banks	to	give	loans.	And	of	course,	loans	and	other	forms	
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of	 credit	 given	 to	 entrepreneurs	 are	 essential	 for	 the	 economic	 recovery.	 So,	 the	 paradox	 of	
regulatory	measures	in	response	to	the	crisis	is	that	they	exacerbate	the	crisis	(Martin	2013).		
	
In	December	2009,	 the	Basel	Committee	reiterated	 that	banks	had	entered	the	crisis	with	 too	
little	 capital	 and	 poor	 efficiency.	 Harmonising	 the	 capital	 reserves,	 monitoring	 standards	 of	
bank	liquidity	and	establishing	a	‘leverage	ratio’2	were	among	the	suggestions	made.	The	issue	
of	assessing	and	predicting	risk	in	financial	operations	was	also	raised.		
	
The	document	released	by	the	Basel	Committee	made	some	commentators	observe	that	it	is	not	
enough	 to	 ‘tighten	 a	 screw	 here	 and	 put	 in	 a	 new	 nail	 there’:	 the	 entire	 ship	 of	 banking	
regulation	needs	a	thorough	overhaul	(Hellwig	2010).	Moreover,	the	regulatory	community	was	
accused	of	 sticking	 to	a	 tradition	of	discussing	among	bureaucratic	cognoscenti,	without	even	
trying	 to	 explain	 to	 the	 public	 at	 large	 the	 effects	 that	 the	 new	 measures	 were	 expected	 to	
produce.		
	
As	 for	 the	 proposed	 measures	 oriented	 toward	 prediction	 of	 risk,	 these	 were	 deemed	
ineffective,	because	risk	cannot	be	reliably	measured.	
	
Managers	Directive	
In	 July	 2011,	 the	 European	 Parliament	 and	 the	 Council	 of	 Europe	 issued	 an	 ‘Alternative	
Investment	 Fund	 Managers	 Directive’.	 The	 Directive	 regulates	 EU	 managers	 who	 deal	 with	
hedge	funds	and	private	equity	funds;	it	establishes	general	operating	conditions	and	limits	to	
leverage,	 while	 calling	 for	 transparency	 and	 stricter	 supervision.	 It	 also	 fixes	 a	 ceiling	 for	
remunerations	 and	 bonuses	 for	 bankers	 and	 brokers,	 while	 requiring	 the	 appointment	 of	
independent	 risk	managers	 and	 evaluators.	 Although	EU	 countries	were	 expected	 to	 turn	 the	
provisions	 of	 the	 Directive	 into	 national	 legislation,	 as	 of	 April	 2014,	 16	member	 states	 had	
failed	 to	 do	 so.	 Asset	 managers	 employed	 in	 the	 UK	 regard	 the	 Directive	 as	 an	 obstacle	 to	
competition	and,	 in	 their	opinion,	will	 reduce	 the	number	of	overseas	agents	operating	 in	 the	
EU.	
	
Regulatory	bodies	
Discussions	following	the	immediate	aftermath	of	the	crisis	indicated	that	reform	had	to	focus	
on	the	relationship	between	governments	and	independent	regulatory	bodies.	Design	faults	in	
the	administrative	and	regulatory	machinery	were	detected.	As	a	remedy,	suggestions	were	put	
forward	to	set	up	committees	formed	of	politicians	and	professional	economists,	with	a	view	to	
exercising	overall	control	over	business	conduct,	on	the	one	hand,	and	over	systemic	issues,	on	
the	 other	 (Goodhart	 2008).	 One	 such	 committee	 set	 up	 in	 2012	 in	 the	 UK	was	 the	 Financial	
Services	 Authority	 (Wilson	 2014),	 which	 does	 not	 tackle	 shadow	 banking,	 with	 the	 latter	
therefore	attracting	an	increasing	number	of	traders	who	feel	that	the	restraints	prevents	them	
from	operating.		
	
Cross‐border	consequences	
Due	 to	 short‐sightedness,	 the	 crisis	 was	 initially	 regarded	 as	 affecting	 individual	 countries,	
while	 its	 cross‐border	 consequences	 were	 almost	 totally	 neglected.	 Bailing	 out	 banks	 was	
perceived	 as	 a	 domestic	 issue	 and	 it	 remained	 unknown	 how	 the	 loss	 burden	 arising	 from	
transnational	 institutions	 might	 be	 handled.	 Only	 later	 were	 international	 changes	 invoked,	
through	a	 ‘Memorandum	of	Understanding’	on	cooperation	for	cross‐border	financial	stability,	
prompting	the	joint	action	of	supervisory	authorities,	central	banks	and	finance	ministries	of	the	
European	Union	countries	(Praet	and	Nguyen	2008).	The	Financial	Stability	Forum	took	the	lead	
in	the	process,	recommending	stricter	monitoring	of	liquidity	and	risk	and	the	enhancement	of	
transparency.	However,	 such	 recommendations	were	 accompanied	 by	 an	underlying	belief	 in	
the	 disciplinary	 role	 of	 markets,	 thus	 displaying	 an	 implicit	 scepticism	 towards	 the	 very	
measures	suggested.	Authorities	were	asked	 to	 investigate	whether	adding	new	requirements	
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to	 adaptive	 market	 practices	 would	 be	 advisable	 or	 might	 end	 up	 being	 redundant.	 Market	
practices,	 in	brief,	were	and	are	still	deemed	 ‘adaptive’	and	self‐disciplined,	 irrespective	of	the	
damage	caused.	
	
The	 type	of	 transparency	advocated	was	 linked	 to	 the	capacity	of	public	authorities	 to	gather	
information,	assess	liquidity	and	appraise	performance.	Transparency,	therefore,	did	not	entail	
stricter	 institutional	control	but	rather	the	possibility	of	quantifying	 losses	and	covering	them	
with	 public	 funds.	 This	 appears	 to	 be	 the	 only	 acceptable	 state	 intervention	 tolerated	 by	
financial	 institutions.	The	network	established	by	 the	Financial	Stability	Forum	was	 therefore	
required	to	gather	data	around	financial	practices,	 ‘encourage	mutual	exchange	of	information	
that	 are	 necessary	 for	 the	 proper	 execution	 of	 the	 mandate	 of	 each	 institution’	 (Praet	 and	
Nguyen	2008:	371).	The	rescue	operations	made	it	clear	what	the	mandate	of	governments	had	
to	be.	Due	 to	 the	global	dimension	of	 the	crisis,	 authorities	 in	all	 the	countries	 involved	were	
asked	to	cooperate	to	resolve	the	crisis	situation.		
	
Internationalisation	 of	 finance	 meant	 that	 all	 national	 bond	 markets	 were	 affected,	 and	 in	
countries	 such	 as	 Ireland	 and	 Spain	domestic	 taxpayers	 found	 themselves	 footing	 the	 bill	 for	
bank	 recapitalisation	 that	 benefited	 foreign	 bond‐	 holders.	 In	 sum,	 responses	 to	 the	 crisis,	 at	
least	 in	 Europe,	 took	 the	 form	 of	 austerity	 packages	 producing	 further	 increases	 in	
unemployment	and	growing	public	unrest	(Calhoun	and	Derluguian	2011;	Turner	2013).	
	
When,	on	31	 January	2011,	Anglo‐Irish	Bank	–	which	had	been	recapitalised	 to	
the	tune	of	25.3	billion	euros	by	Irish	taxpayers	–	repaid	in	full	and	on	schedule	a	
750	million	 euro	 bond	 to	 its	 investors,	 the	 distribution	 of	 risk	 under	 the	 new	
regime	of	sovereign	credit	support	for	banks	was	on	stark	display.	The	total	cuts	
to	welfare	spending	in	that	year’s	Irish	budget	amounted	to	a	little	over	the	same	
amount.	(Martin	2013:	238)	
	
In	 the	 past,	 it	 was	 acceptable	 that	 ordinary	 citizens	 helped	 bond‐holders,	 because	 almost	
everybody,	 through	 pension	 and	 mutual	 funds,	 was	 a	 bond‐holder.	 But	 with	 the	 growing	
polarisation	 of	 wealth,	 an	 elite	 has	 taken	 shape	 which	 detains	 large	 quantities	 of	 assets	 and	
then,	when	in	trouble,	expects	to	be	bailed	out	by	those	who	detain	little.		
	
In	 brief,	 the	 need	 for	 and	 the	 form	 of	 public	 intervention	 were	 and	 still	 are	 taken	 as	 an	
undisputable	given.	The	principles	enunciated	by	the	Forum	reaffirmed	‘the	primacy	of	private	
sector	solutions’,	but	‘when	a	strictly	private‐sector	solution	cannot	be	found,	public	funds	have	
to	 be	 mobilised’	 (Praet	 and	 Nguyen	 2008:	 372).	 Authorities,	 by	 intervening,	 do	 not	 have	 to	
rescue	 those	harmed	by	 the	 financial	 crisis,	but	 simply	attempt	 to	 strengthen	market	players’	
confidence.	Finally,	it	was	felt	that	public	intervention	could	not	be	restrained	through	ex‐ante	
rules,	 but	had	 to	 remain	 ‘open’	 to	 contingent	necessities	 emerging	by	 future	 crises.	With	 this,	
state	 intervention	 in	 support	 of	 financial	 markets	 was	 not	 only	 definitively	 ratified,	 but	 all	
qualitative	and	quantitative	limits	to	that	intervention	were	lifted.		
	
Regulating	Europe	
‘A	crisis	is	a	terrible	thing	to	waste’,	goes	the	motto,	meaning	of	course	that	errors	committed	in	
the	 past	 can	 bring	 to	 more	 efficient	 arrangements.	 Not	 so	 in	 the	 UK,	 where	 ‘light	 touch’	
regulation	 is	 still	 preferred,	 and	where	 reform	 finds	 an	 impervious	 terrain,	 showing	 how	 the	
conflicting	 interests	 of	 EU	 member	 states	 are	 significant	 (Begg	 2009).	 Regulating	 financial	
operations	 is	 problematic	 for	 the	 EU	 because	 of	 the	 clashes	 between	 national	 sensitivities.	
Disagreements	 are	 hard	 to	 avoid	when	 discussing	 how	best	 to	 reach	 a	 coherent	 approach	 to	
cross‐border	 risks	 and	 burden‐sharing.	 ‘The	 UK	 has	 sought	 to	 avoid	 a	 dominant	 role	 for	 EU	
bodies	in	supervision	which	could	pose	a	competitive	threat	to	the	City	of	London’	(Begg	2009:	
1121).	The	new	European	System	of	Financial	Supervisors	outflanks	the	problem	by	granting	an	
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enhanced	 role	 to	 national	 supervisors.	 No	 changes	 in	 this	 specific	 area	 can	 therefore	 be	
recorded.	
	
Changing	 the	 rules	 amounts	 to	 interfering	 with	 both	 domestic	 and	 European	 legislation.	 A	
further	 problem	 arises	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 euro	 area	 and	 the	 EU	have	 different	 forms	 and	
intensity	of	membership,	so	that	the	interplay	between	monetary	policy	and	financial	regulation	
is	 complicated	 and	 ‘raises	questions	 about	which	 institution	 should	 take	 the	 lead	 at	EU	 level’	
(Begg	2009:	1114).	
	
A	 further	 issue	 affecting	 European	 integration	 is	 that,	 as	 we	 have	 seen,	 ultimately	 taxpayers	
bear	the	risk	of	financial	market	failures.	Because	taxpayers	are	national,	not	European	subjects,	
it	 is	 at	 the	 national	 level	 that	 austerity	 measures	 are	 designed	 as	 a	 result.	 Yet,	 financial	
operations	 involve	 a	number	of	 countries	 simultaneously,	hence	 the	unfair	 situation	 in	which	
those	nations	burdened	with	cuts	and	penalties	find	themselves.	For	instance,	the	collapse	of	a	
British	bank	may	 lead	to	calls	on	 taxpayers	 from	other	member	states	to	 foot	 the	bill,	but	 the	
negative	reaction	on	the	part	of	non‐British	nationals	can	be	easily	predicted.	For	this	reason,	
authorities	designing	new	regulations	hesitate	and	fail	to	take	action,	thus	exacerbating	risk	for	
future	failings.	
	
The	Volker	rule	
In	early	2009,	President	Obama	appointed	an	Economic	Recovery	Advisory	Board,	 chaired	by	
Paul	 Volcker,	 a	 former	 Chairman	 of	 the	 Federal	 Reserve.	 The	Board	was	 tasked	with	making	
proposals	for	the	reform	of	the	financial	sector.		
	
In	 the	 UK,	 the	 newly‐formed	 coalition	 government,	 in	 June	 2010,	 created	 an	 Independent	
Commission	on	Banking	under	the	leadership	of	the	eminent	Oxford	economist	Sir	John	Vickers.	
The	Volcker	and	 the	Vickers	 groups	had	 slightly	differing	views	but	 ended	up	 recommending	
similar	policies,	specifically	the	separation	of	banking	activities	into	distinct	sectors.	It	has	to	be	
noted	that	in	the	US	such	separation	was	ratified	by	the	Glass‐Steagall	Act	1933,	passed	into	law	
in	response	to	a	crisis	affecting	many	commercial	banks.	The	Act	was	partially	repealed	in	1999	
by	 the	 Financial	 Services	 Modernization	 Act,	 with	 the	 result	 that	 the	 distinction	 between	
commercial	and	investment	banks	was	eliminated,	‘turning	the	financial	markets	into	a	free‐for‐
all	and	establishing	a	criminogenic	environment’	(Barak	2012:	12).	
	
The	 Volker	 and	 the	 Vickers	 groups	 drew	 a	 line	 between	 client‐oriented	 and	 proprietary	
banking,	retail	and	wholesale	markets.	The	Volcker	rule	is	understood	as	a	ban	on	proprietary	
trading	by	commercial	banks.	Volcker	argued	that	banks	engaged	in	high‐risk	speculation	were	
damaging	 the	 entire	 system	 and	 that	 the	 growing	 use	 of	 derivatives	 had	 to	 be	 halted.	 As	 of	
February	2013,	 the	 rule	had	not	yet	been	 implemented	and,	 in	 the	US	as	well	 as	 in	 the	UK,	 a	
reduction	 rather	 than	 a	 prohibition	 of	 hedge	 fund	 ownership	 by	 banks	 was	 introduced	
(Goldstein	 2014).	 European	 Union	 countries	 have	 also	 discussed	 the	 rule,	 reaching	 the	
conclusion	 that	 limitations	 rather	 than	 a	 total	 ban	 on	 hedge	 funds	 dealing	 by	 banks	 are	
acceptable.	 In	 both	 Europe	 and	 the	 US,	 however,	 the	 very	 discussion	 of	 the	 Volcker	 rule	 has	
caused	an	exodus	of	traders	from	large	banks	to	small	hedge	fund	dealers,	thus	reproducing	the	
grey	financial	area	that	contributed	to	the	crisis	in	the	first	place.		
	
In	 the	 UK,	 the	 distinction	 between	 investment	 banks	 and	 retail	 banks	 has	 not	 marked	 the	
decline	 of	 ‘packages’,	 ‘which	 are	 still	 available	 while	 regulators	 are	 impotent.	 They	 are	
underfunded	and	have	little	experience.	At	times	they	ignore	what	exactly	they	have	to	check	or	
regulate.	It	is	bankers	themselves	who	advise	clumsy	regulators	as	to	what	they	should	look	into	
(Dermine	2013;	Prins	2014).		
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The	Haldane	doctrine	
The	Executive	Director	for	Financial	Stability	at	the	Bank	of	England,	Andrew	Haldane,	admitted	
that	 the	 financial	 crash	 made	 ‘the	 riches	 be	 privatised	 and	 the	 rags	 socialised’.	 But	 it	 was	
nobody’s	fault:	‘For	the	most	part	the	financial	crisis	was	not	the	result	of	individual	wickedness	
or	folly.	It	was	not	a	story	of	pantomime	villains	and	village	idiots.	Instead,	the	crisis	reflected	a	
failure	of	the	entire	system	of	financial	sector	governance’	(Haldane	2013:	21).	Putting	events	in	
historical	 perspective,	 he	 also	 explained	 that	 in	 the	 first	 half	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 the	
business	of	banking	was	simple:	the	owners‐managers	backed	the	bank’s	losses	with	their	own	
personal	 finances.	Shareholder	 funds	(so‐called	equity	capital)	protected	clients	 from	loss	and	
bank	 directors	 excluded	 investors	 who	 were	 financially	 weak	 in	 facing	 risk.	 Things	 changed	
with	the	emergence	of	giants	embracing	the	‘too	big	to	fail’	doctrine.		
	
At	 the	 start	 of	 the	 20th	 century,	 the	 assets	 of	 the	 UK’s	 three	 largest	 banks	
accounted	for	less	than	10	per	cent	of	GDP.	By	2007,	that	figure	had	risen	above	
200	per	 cent	of	GDP.	When	 these	 institutions	hit	 problems,	 a	bad	 situation	 can	
become	 catastrophic.	 In	 this	 crisis,	 as	 in	 past	 ones,	 catastrophe	 insurance	 was	
supplied	not	by	private	creditors	but	by	 taxpayers.	Only	 they	had	pockets	deep	
enough	to	refloat	banks	with	such	huge	assets.	This	story	has	been	repeated	for	
the	 better	 part	 of	 a	 century	 and	 a	 half;	 in	 evolutionary	 terms,	 we	 have	 had	
survival	 not	 of	 the	 fittest	 but	 the	 fattest.	 I	 call	 this	 phenomenon	 doom	 loop	
[emphasis	in	original].	(Haldane	2013:	22)	
	
In	Haldane’s	view,	ownership	and	control	of	banks	have	been	 left	 in	 the	hands	of	a	myriad	of	
agents	and	brokers	 taking	high	 risk	and	receiving	 large	 incentives.	 In	 this	situation,	while	 the	
losers	are	easy	to	identify,	the	beneficiaries	should	be	found	among	small‐term	investors	lured	
into	quick‐profit	operations.	His	proposals	for	reform	hinge	on	reshaping	risk‐taking	incentives	
on	a	durable	basis	and	increasing	the	equity	capital	of	banks.	Such	measures	would	increase	the	
banks’	 capacity	 to	 absorb	 loss	 and	 reduce	 the	 risk	 they	 can	 take.	 The	 proposals	 of	 the	 Basel	
Committee	 mentioned	 above	 constitute,	 in	 his	 opinion,	 a	 significant	 piece	 of	 reform	 in	 this	
respect.	
	
Bank	governance	and	control,	 in	Haldane’s	argument,	 should	be	 improved	 through	 increasing	
expertise	 and	granting	more	power	 to	 risk	 committees.	Voting	 rights	within	banks	 should	be	
extended	 to	wider	 groups	of	 stakeholders,	 thus	 establishing	 genuine	principles	 of	 democratic	
governance.	Of	course,	pluralism	in	boards	of	governors	comes	at	a	cost:	consensual	decisions	
are	 slow	 to	 reach	 and	 action	 can	 become	 ineffective.	 But	 this	 is	 balanced	 by	 the	 benefits	
pluralism	produces	in	avoiding	catastrophic	errors.	
	
In	 his	 evolutionary	 analysis,	 Haldane	 highlighted	 the	 increasing	 role	 played	 by	 ‘economic	
formality’,	 with	 mathematics	 underpinning	 models,	 and	 predictions	 and	 concepts	 being	
formalised	to	the	point	of	shaping	a	theological	doctrine.	Businesses,	in	the	past,	would	have	on	
their	 boards	 experts	 in	 the	 area	 in	 which	 they	 operated.	 Now,	 he	 noted,	 all	 businesses,	
irrespective	of	the	area,	employ	experts	in	economics	and	financial	matters.	On	the	contrary,	it	
should	be	acknowledged	that	even	experts	have	imperfect	information	and	are	surrounded	by	
uncertainty,	and	economists	in	general	should	have	a	narrower	view	of	themselves	(Davies	and	
Haldane	 2012).	 Ultimately,	 a	 good	 leap	 forward	 was	 achieved	 in	 splitting	 up	 banks	 and	
diversifying	their	activities,	with	the	distinction	between	retail	and	propriety	institutions.	As	for	
the	 2008	 crisis,	 Haldane	 concluded,	 mistakes	 were	 made,	 although	 they	 were	 ‘honest’,	 not	
fraudulent	mistakes,	and	anyone	would	have	made	them	given	how	uncertain	the	world	is.		
	
Critics	of	 the	Haldane	doctrine	note	 that	 the	amount	of	public	 funds	spent	 to	 rescue	 financial	
firms	overweighs	the	annual	expenditure	for	social	security	and	education	and	is	almost	equal	
the	expenditure	for	health	(MacKenzie	2013).	The	Basel	Committee	has	never	been	effective	in	
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enforcing	rules	and	has	been	too	generous	to	banks	in	establishing	the	amount	of	liquidity	these	
were	prompted	to	possess	(Pinto	2014).	Challenging	Haldane’s	view	that	individuals	and	boards	
of	governors	were	not	to	be	deemed	responsible	for	the	crisis:		
	
The	 bonus	 culture	 requires	 radical	 change,	 much	 more	 than	 the	 response	
Haldane	suggest.	Senior	bank	executives	and	board	members	should	be	liable	to	
charges	 of	 negligence	 and	 reckless	 lending	 in	 the	 event	 of	 bank	 failure	 and	
subject	 to	 suspension.	 Unless	 we	 get	 rid	 of	 the	 chancers	 and	 rogues,	 the	most	
determined	regulation	will	have	no	effect	whatsoever.	(Pinto	2014:	231)	
	
The	Financial	Services	Act	2013	
Why	 financial	misconduct	 should	 attract	 criminal	 liability	 is	 contentious.	 The	perception	 that	
financial	 crime	 is	 ‘less	 criminal’	 than	 other	 conventional	 criminal	 activity	 makes	 even	 the	
Financial	Services	Act	introduced	in	the	UK	in	2013	of	dubious	validity.	Optimist	commentators	
may	 argue	 that	 the	 Act	 continues	 the	 British	 long‐standing	 tradition	 in	 tackling	 large‐scale	
illegality	 in	 the	world	 of	 finance	 (Wilson	 2014).	 However,	 critics	 suggest	 that	most	 available	
legislation	is	unable	to	deal	with	the	variety	and	scale	of	financial	malpractice,	whose	nature	and	
multifaceted	 characteristics	 are	 not	 sufficiently	 understood	 (Mirowski	 2014).	 Moreover,	
prosecuting	 managers	 who	 opt	 for	 high‐risk	 practices	 proves	 ineffective	 because	 financial	
operations,	 by	 definition,	 involve	 risk‐taking.	 All	 recent	 legislation,	 in	 sum,	 may	 do	 little	 to	
reduce	 the	 difference	 between	 enforcement	 responses	 to	 white‐collar	 and	 responses	 to	
conventional	 criminality:	 we	 still	 witness	 a	 situation	 in	 which	 attention	 paid	 to	 crime	 is	
inversely	proportional	with	the	amount	of	social	harm	produced	(Will	et	al.	2012).	Finally,	the	
Financial	Services	Act	2013,	as	would	be	expected,	totally	ignores	the	grey	financial	area	which	
in	the	UK	still	constitutes	a	large	sector	of	the	 financial	sphere	as	a	whole	(see	the	case	of	the	
Channel	Islands	below).		
	
Business	as	usual?	
Authors	remarking	 the	 lack	of	major	prosecutions	of	companies	or	 individuals	after	 the	crisis	
point	out	 the	 influence	of	 large	 financial	 institutions	on	 law‐making	and	regulation,	as	well	as	
the	 high	 status	 of	 potential	 defendants	 (Pontell,	 Black	 and	 Geis	 2014;	 Rakoff	 2014).	
Examinations	of	 recent	 transnational	 responses	highlight	how	 the	 complexity	of	 cross‐border	
financial	 linkages	makes	 rules	 difficult	 to	 implement.	 This	 is	 due,	 among	 other	 things,	 to	 the	
persistent	tensions	between	transnational	measures	and	national	policies.	The	on‐going	power	
of	private	actors	(grey	banking),	moreover,	is	said	to	have	made	regulatory	responses	fall	short	
of	 what	 would	 be	 needed	 (Porter	 2014).	 However,	 among	 the	 concerns	 of	 agencies	 and	
individual	senior	operators	supporting	new	bank	regulations	are	‘cyber	risks’	which	may	have	
systemic	implications,	the	survival	of	the	‘too	big	to	fail’	credo,	the	future	low	levels	of	interest	
rates	 caused	by	 excessive	 regulation,	 and	 the	 growth	of	non‐bank	 institutions	 (grey	 banking)	
taking	on	the	role	of	 financing	the	economy.	On	this	 last	point,	we	have	seen	the	 fast	move	of	
intermediaries	and	operators	 towards	alternative	 financial	 firms	as	a	 response	 to	 the	Volcker	
rule.	On	the	prospect	of	declining	rates	of	 interests	for	investors,	commentators	fail	 to	predict	
how	 this	 will	 encourage	 new	 forms	 of	 financial	 criminality	 as	 a	 way	 of	 making	 up	 for	 the	
interests	lost.	On	‘cyber	risks’	we	are	uncertain	whether	this	refers	to	new	forms	of	criminality	
spreading	 in	 the	domain	of	 financial	 fraud.	 In	brief,	 the	concerns	expressed	 encompass	white	
collar	 as	well	 as	 organised	 forms	 of	 conventional	 criminality	 that	may	 be	 undeterred	 by	 the	
array	of	new	regulations	discussed	and/or	implemented.	The	following	section	lists	a	series	of	
recent	episodes	proving	the	apparent	inefficacy	(or	the	efficacy?)	of	regulations.	
	
Zombie	funds	
The	City	regulator	called	in	lawyers	to	scrutinise	the	announcement	of	an	investigation	into	30	
million	 pension	 and	 investment	 policies.	 The	 news	 sent	 shares	 in	 leading	 British	 insurers	
tumbling	 (Collinson	 and	Osborne	 2014).	 The	 policies	 scrutinised	were	 sold	 in	 the	 1980s	 and	
Vincenzo	Ruggiero:	Social	Harm	and	the	Vagaries	of	Financial	Regulation	in	the	UK	
IJCJ&SD								98	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com	 	 ©	2015	4(4)	
1990s	and	savers	were	trapped	by	penalty	charges	of	10‐12	per	cent	and	in	some	cases	more	
than	20	per	 cent	 if	 they	wanted	 to	move	 their	money.	 The	 first	 two	 years	 of	 contribution	by	
savers	 covered	 commissions	 earned	 by	 salespersons	 and	 annual	 charges	were	 around	 4	 per	
cent	per	year.	 These	policies	 are	 still	 in	use	 and	 the	 regulator	assured	 financial	 firms	 that	no	
compensation	for	customers	would	be	imposed.	Loss	by	savers	is	called	‘market	value	adjuster’.	
Customers,	in	brief,	are	trapped	in	funds	where	the	annual	bonuses	have	often	fallen	to	zero	and	
where	 they	do	not	have	 access	 to	 their	 savings	 until	 retirement	age.	Regulators,	 on	 the	other	
hand,	 cannot	 review	 the	 millions	 of	 policies	 individually;	 they	 cannot	 remove	 exit	 penalties	
without	an	ad	hoc	piece	of	legislation;	they	are	impotent	when	it	comes	to	introducing	change	in	
sales	 practices,	 and	 cannot	 apply	 current	 standard	 retrospectively,	 let	 alone	 calling	 for	
compensation	of	savers.	
	
This	 case	 prompts	 two	 observations.	 First,	 investigations	 such	 as	 this	 determine	 a	 plunge	 in	
share	values;	therefore	they	are	feared	by	firms	as	well	as	customers,	with	the	former	pointing	
out	 the	 damaging	 effects	 that	 any	 attempt	 at	 regulation	may	 produce.	 The	 status	 quo,	 in	 this	
view,	is	less	harmful	than	any	sort	of	external	intervention.	Second,	disappointment	and	fear	by	
savers	may	lead	competing	firms	to	offer	their	own	services,	persuading	people	to	move	money	
out	of	their	pensions	to	their	own	schemes.	Such	unsolicited	offers	of	help	may	hide	yet	more	
speculative	or	even	fraudulent	purposes.	
	
Libor	interest	rates	
The	 ‘London	 interbank	 offered	 rate’	 (Libor)	 was	 involved	 in	 criminal	 activity	 (illegally	
establishing	 currency	 exchange	 rates)	 affecting	 more	 than	 a	 dozen	 institutions	 on	 three	
continents.	Investors	were	outraged	when	the	scale	of	the	offence	was	revealed,	with	Barclays	
Bank	being	asked	to	pay	a	hefty	penalty	for	moving	the	exchange	benchmarks	and	thus	gaining	
illicit	profits	(Ruggiero	2013).	An	enquiry	led	to	three	employees	being	charged	by	the	Serious	
Fraud	Office	(SFO)	for	conspiracy	to	fix	Libor	interest	rates.	According	to	the	SFO	the	offences	
took	place	between	August	2006	and	September	2010,	therefore	before	but	also	well	after	the	
effects	of	the	2008	crisis	came	to	light	(Bowers	2014).	City	trader	Tom	Hayes	was	sentenced	in	
2015	to	fourteen	years	in	jail,	becoming	the	first	person	to	be	convicted	by	a	jury	for	rigging	the	
Libor	interest	rate	(Hickey	and	Grierson	2015).		
	
Co‐op	Bank	
This	 bank	 had	 a	 £1.5bn	 deficit	 in	 2013	 and	was	 bailed	 out	 by	 hedge‐fund	 investors	 and	 the	
wider	 Co‐operative	 Group.	 In	 2014,	 the	 Bank	 admitted	 that	 it	 needed	 a	 further	 £400m	 to	
balance	 its	 accounts	 (Armitage	 and	 Goodway	 2014).	 Mis‐selling	 of	 pension	 schemes	 and	
interest‐rate‐hedging	 products	were	 certified,	 as	well	 as	 breaches	 of	 the	Consumer	Credit	Act	
2006.	Shareholders,	 largely	consisting	of	hedge	 funds	and	 institutions,	will	be	required	to	 foot	
the	bill.		
	
The	Co‐op	Group	was	itself	in	turmoil	after	the	resignation	of	its	chief	executive.	The	situation	
further	 alienated	 the	 ethical	 investors	 traditionally	 attracted	 to	 the	 Co‐op	 Bank’s	 previous	
collective	ownership	structure.	Some	charities	began	looking	for	alternative	places	to	bank	after	
the	hedge	funds	became	the	majority	of	shareholders.	The	Co‐op	Bank	confirmed	that	it	will	cut	
1,000	jobs	from	its	10,000‐strong	workforce	and	close	30	of	its	branches.		
	
Cases	 such	as	 this	may	become	more	 frequent	 in	 the	 future	due	 to	 the	 changing	 features	and	
compositions	 of	 the	 National	 Audit	 Office	 (NAO).	 The	 NAO	 warned	 that	 a	 brain	 drain	 from	
Britain’s	City	watchdogs	has	 led	to	their	employing	thousands	of	 inexperienced	staff.	A	report	
published	 by	 NAO	 expressed	 grave	 concerns	 that	 a	 third	 of	 staff	 at	 the	 Financial	 Conduct	
Authority	 have	 less	 than	 two	 years’	 experience	 while	 a	 quarter	 of	 leavers	 from	 the	 Bank	 of	
England’s	Prudential	Regulation	Authority	are	rated	top	performers.	On	the	contrary,	 it	would	
be	 vital	 for	 both	 watchdogs	 to	 attract	 and	 retain	 the	 right	 staff	 to	 cope	 with	 the	 challenges	
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arising	from	the	financial	crisis.	The	report	stressed	the	importance	of	effective	oversight	of	an	
industry	 that	 is	 valued	 at	more	 than	 £234bn.	 Regulated	 firms	 paid	 £664m	 in	 the	 2013‐2014	
financial	year	to	keep	their	regulators	running,	24	per	cent	more	than	in	the	previous	year.	The	
increase	 is	 said	 to	 result	 from	expensive	and	 time‐consuming	 investigations.	Therefore,	 firms	
can	 claim	 that	 regulation	 is	 wasteful.	 Problems	 are	 compounded	 by	 the	 realisation	 by	 some	
regional	directors	of	 the	 astronomical	 level	 of	 remuneration	 enjoyed	by	 top	managers	before	
and	even	after	the	crisis.	But,	as	some	commentators	sarcastically	remark:	‘The	rich	deserve	to	
be	rich’	(Krugman	2014).	
	
Lloyds	Banking	Group	
One	 of	 Britain’s	 biggest	 banks	 has	 cost	 victims	 of	 the	 payment	 protection	 insurance	 (PPI)	
scandal	 tens	 of	 millions	 of	 pounds	 by	 wrongly	 cutting	 their	 compensation	 awards.	 Lloyds	
Banking	 Group,	 which	 is	 33	 per	 cent	 owned	 by	 the	 taxpayer,	 has	 been	 cutting	 pay‐outs	 to	
victims	who	were	mis‐sold	the	notorious	insurance	policies	intended	to	cover	loan	payments	if	
borrowers	 found	 themselves	unable	 to	work	 (mentioned	above	 as	CDOs).	 Loans	were	mainly	
linked	to	property	mortgages.	 In	many	cases,	 the	 fine	print	meant	that	customers	could	never	
make	a	claim.	This	is	a	case	of	a	taxpayer‐sponsored	bank	depriving	taxpayers	of	their	rightful	
compensation	by	using	a	loophole	(Harper	2014).	
	
This	case	shows	that	the	banking	system	itself	is	the	root	cause	of	severe	instability.	More	than	
three	quarters	of	bank	 loans	are	 linked	 to	property	and	this	creates	a	self‐fuelling	boom‐and‐
bust	 cycle.	 The	 availability	 of	 credit	 pushes	 up	 property	 prices	 and,	 as	 prices	 rise,	 further	
speculative	borrowing	and	buying	are	encouraged,	thus	pushing	prices	up	even	more	and	well	
beyond	what	is	sustainable	in	the	long	term.	When	the	bust	comes,	the	spiral	goes	into	reverse	
and	the	deleveraging	causes	huge	pain	throughout	the	economy.	The	role	of	banks	in	economic	
textbooks	 is	 to	provide	 capital	 to	 entrepreneurs	 to	build	businesses.	That	happens	very	 little.	
We	can	suggest	that	today,	the	role	of	banks	is	to	finance	speculation	in	second‐hand	property.		
	
Channel	Islands	
The	Channel	 Islands,	particularly	 Jersey,	Guernsey,	 Sark	 and	 the	 Isle	of	Man,	 continue	 to	play	
their	 role.	 Described	 as	 ‘the	 worst	 tax	 dodgers’,	 they	 are	 inaccessible	 to	 foreign	 authorities	
engaged	 in	 investigations	 on	 tax	 evasion	 and	 financial	 fraud.	 In	 the	 Isle	 of	 Man	 there	 are	
thousands	of	completely	unsupervised	companies	whose	owners	are	hidden.	 In	Guernsey	and	
Sark	 it	 is	 common	 for	 local	 residents	 to	 act	 as	 bogus	 ‘nominee’	 directors	 for	 tax‐dodging	
companies.	‘The	Channel	Islands	make	so	much	money	that	islanders	enjoy	a	standard	of	living	
twice	 higher	 than	 that	 on	mainland	 Britain.	 A	 vast	 service	 industry	 has	 sprung	 up,	 involving	
lawyers,	 solicitors,	 accountants	 and	 banks’	 (Christensen	 2011:	 177).	 Money	 to	 the	 Channel	
Islands	 also	 arrives	 in	 the	 form	 of	 payments	 to	 supposed	 suppliers	 servicing	 entrepreneurs	
based	on	mainland	UK	or	in	other	countries.	In	general,	tax	havens	are	regarded	as	prominent	
features	 of	 the	 globalised	 capital	 market	 and	 their	 very	 existence	 continues	 to	 create	 a	
‘criminogenic	 environment	 in	 which	 illicit	 financial	 flows	 are	 easily	 disguised	 and	 hidden	
amongst	legitimate	commercial	transactions’	(Christensen	2011:	177).	
	
In	the	British	territories	there	are	still	three	million	companies	whose	owners	are	unknown.	It	is	
also	 unknown	 who	 actually	 lies	 behind	 trusts	 and	 foundations,	 due	 to	 ownership	 secrecy	
remaining	inviolable.		
	
Office	of	Tony	Blair	
Evidence	of	 how	 the	borders	between	 legitimate	 and	 illegitimate	practices	 are	uncertain	was	
provided	by	controversial	news	relating	to	the	companies	owned	by	former	UK	Prime	Minister	
Tony	Blair.	Income	channelled	through	a	complex	network	of	firms	and	partnerships	controlled	
by	Blair	rose	more	than	40	per	cent	in	2011	to	more	than	£12m.	Of	this,	almost	£10m	was	paid	
for	 ‘management	 services’.	 The	 money	 was	 transferred	 via	 a	 network	 of	 firms	 and	 financial	
Vincenzo	Ruggiero:	Social	Harm	and	the	Vagaries	of	Financial	Regulation	in	the	UK	
IJCJ&SD								100	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com	 	 ©	2015	4(4)	
vehicles.	 Accountancy	 experts	 questioned	 the	 arcane	 nature	 of	 the	 network’s	 finances,	which	
makes	it	difficult	to	trace	where	its	money	is	coming	from	or	where	it	is	being	spent.	Windrush	
Ventures	 is	 the	name	of	 the	pool	of	 companies	 linked	 to	 the	 ‘Office	of	Tony	Blair’,	but	exactly	
what	 sort	 of	 ‘management	 services’	 are	 provided,	 and	 how	 the	 companies	 generate	 their	
income,	 are	 impossible	 to	determine.	Blair	has	provided	 advice	and	 consultancy	 to	 charitable	
foundations	 for	 poverty	 relief	 projects	 in	 Sierra	 Leone	 and	 Rwanda,	 creating	 his	 own	 Africa	
Governance	Initiative.	He	has	also	advised	heads	of	states	and	global	corporations,	which	led	to	
criticism	 for	 the	way	 his	 private	 and	 philanthropic	 activities	 tend	 to	merge.	 He	 has	 lucrative	
consultancy	 contracts	 with	 luxury	 goods	 firms	 and	 insurance	 companies	 in	 Switzerland,	 has	
undertaken	work	 for	 the	 royal	 family	 of	 Kuwait,	 an	 investment	 firm	 in	Abu	Dhabi	 and	 an	 oil	
company	 in	 South	 Korea.	 Blair	 is	 taking	 advantage	 of	 laws	 allowing	 him	 to	 limit	 what	 his	
companies	and	partnerships	are	 required	 to	disclose	with	 the	 result	 that	his	 accounts	are	 far	
from	transparent	(Doward	2012).	
	
Glencore	International	
International	 aid	 is	 supposed	 to	 benefit	 small	 businesses	 and	 vulnerable	 peoples,	 like	 for	
example	 the	aid	provided	through	 the	World	Food	Programme,	which	 is	aimed	at	 feeding	 the	
starving	and	committed	to	buying	food	from	very	poor	farmers	and	whose	 finances	consist	of	
donations.	However,	during	the	2011‐12	period,	more	than	£500m	ended	up	in	the	hands	of	a	
London‐listed	 commodities	 trader,	 Glencore	 International.	 This	 conglomerate,	which	 buys	 up	
supplies	 from	 farmers	 and	 sells	 them	 on	 at	 a	 profit,	 was	 in	 that	 period	 the	 biggest	 single	
supplier	 of	 wheat	 to	 the	 WFP.	 ‘In	 the	 latest	 half‐year	 financial	 results,	 Glencore,	 which	
previously	 attracted	 controversy	 for	 environmental	 breaches	 and	 accusations	 of	 dealing	with	
rogue	states,	reported	that	revenue	from	agricultural	products	doubled	to	$8.8m’	(Neate	2012).	
Betting	 on	 rising	wheat	 price,	 lobbying	 for	 bans	 on	 exportations	 from	some	 countries,	 taking	
advantage	 from	 droughts	 and	 investing	 in	 agricultural	 ‘products	 futures’	 allow	 giant	 food	
wholesalers	to	capitalise	on	‘inert’	donation	finances	and	turn	them	into	profit.	As	a	technique	of	
rationalisation,	wholesalers	might	well	mobilise	 the	 argument	 that	 they	 are	 less	 corrupt	 and	
more	ethical	than	arms	producers,	because	they	at	least	provide	food,	not	weapons.	
	
Flash	brokers	
‘Flash	 brokers’	 manage	 to	 beat	 regulators	 through	 high	 frequency	 trading,	 which	 is	 not	 just	
regarded	as	risky.	‘It	is	a	form	of	legalised	theft,	designed	to	allow	traders	to	skim	profits	from	
other	 investors’	 (Surowiecki	 2014:	 37).	 Put	 simply,	 an	 investor	 intending	 to	 buy	 shares,	
fractions	of	 second	before	hitting	 the	enter	button,	may	 find	 the	price	of	 those	 shares	higher.	
Orders	 to	buy,	 in	other	words,	are	captured	by	other	 traders	who	buy	the	wanted	shares	and	
resell	them	at	higher	prices	(Lewis	2014).	
	
Tesco	
Giant	 supermarket	 chain	 Tesco	was	 involved	 in	 an	 accounting	 scandal,	 having	 released	 false	
data	on	profits	 in	order	to	reassure	shareholders	and	attract	new	investors.	Huge	 losses	were	
suffered	by	pension	funds,	traders,	small	investors	and	staff	holding	shares.	At	the	basis	of	the	
irregular	 accounts	was	 the	 practice	 to	 demand	 financial	 contributions	 from	 suppliers	 and	 to	
record	these	payments	in	a	creative	fashion,	thus	pretending	a	healthy	financial	situation	while	
sales	declined.	Companies	such	as	Tesco	are	not	required	to	disclose	supplier	contributions	in	
their	trading	statements.	About	£700m	were	wiped	off	the	stock	market	value	of	the	company,	
and	while	 shareholders	were	defrauded,	 annual	 salaries	 amounting	 to	 around	£1m	were	 still	
given	to	senior	managers	after	the	investigation	was	launched	(Wood	2014).	
	
Barclays	Bank	
This	 large	 bank	 institution	 was	 accused	 by	 a	 campaign	 group	 of	 encouraging	 international	
fraudsters	 through	 its	 loose	 security	 procedures.	 The	 bank	 allowed	 individuals	 holding	
unchecked	 international	 passports	 to	 open	 accounts	 and	 set	 up	 fraudulent	 businesses.	 One	
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example	was	a	multi‐million	pound	fraud	against	holidaymakers	who	booked	villas	and	homes	
in	exotic	resorts	and	transferred	money	through	the	bank,	only	to	find	that	those	villas	or	homes	
did	not	exist	or	were	not	for	rent.	Campaigners	posing	as	potential	investors	found	that	Barclays	
staff	were	extremely	lax	when	examining	applications,	at	times	only	requiring	a	foreign	driving	
licence	 as	 ID.	 Fraudsters	 from	around	 the	world	 are	 attracted	 to	 the	 bank	 and,	 after	 opening	
their	accounts,	they	can	comfortably	operate	from	anywhere	they	choose	(Brignall	2014).	
	
The	balloon	effect	
The	 European	 Securities	 and	 Markets	 Authority	 (ESMA	 2014)	 has	 recently	 expressed	 its	
optimism,	 documenting	 improving	 market	 conditions,	 bolstered	 by	 a	 combination	 of	
macroeconomic	 prospects	 and	 liquidity	 support	 measures	 from	 central	 banks.	 Risks,	 we	 are	
told,	 are	 now	 below	 those	 observed	 in	 the	more	 acute	 phases	 of	 the	 crisis.	 In	 this	 paper,	 by	
contrast,	it	has	been	argued	that	many	of	the	measures	proposed	to	prevent	future	crises	have	
been	contested,	amended	or	scrapped.	When	applied,	their	potential	effect	has	been	neutralised	
through	 the	 creation	 or	 expansion	 of	 areas	 impervious	 to	 regulation.	 The	 phenomenon	
possesses	 some	 similitude	 with	 illegal	 drugs	 markets,	 where	 enforcement	 targeting	 one	
substance	 or	 distributing	 route	 directs	 business	 towards	 other	 substances	 and	 routes,	 like	 a	
balloon	‘bulging’	here	or	there	according	to	where	it	is	squeezed.		
	
The	suggestion	that	banks	should	hold	significant	quantities	of	cash	or	highly	liquid	securities	in	
their	 portfolios	 has	 been	 countered	 with	 the	 argument	 that	 higher	 resources	 would	 expose	
banks	 to	 higher	 loss	 in	 case	 of	 further	 financial	 crises.	 Despite	 reforms	 introduced	 in	 the	
banking	 sector	 aimed	 at	 safeguarding	 customers	 and	 small	 businesses	 and	 the	 separation	 of	
retail	and	property	banks	(GOV.UK	2014),	debts	were	and	remain	saleable	commodities,	and	the	
‘maturity	gap’	which	contributed	to	the	collapse	is	stationary	or	widening.	The	proposed	limits	
for	 remuneration	 and	bonuses	 for	bankers	and	brokers	has	been	met	with	 the	objection	 that	
such	limits	hamper	competition	and	reduce	the	number	of	capable	managers	prepared	to	work	
in	the	financial	sector.		
	
Orthodoxy	has	spawned	a	series	of	shared	assumptions	regarding	feasible	and	desirable	forms	
of	regulation	(Tombs	2015),	while	the	appointment	of	growing	numbers	of	regulators	has	been	
criticised	 for	 the	 lack	 of	 skills	 and	 professionalism	 the	 new	 appointees	 display.	 Even	 the	
Financial	 Services	Act	2013,	 as	we	 have	 seen,	may	 prove	 relatively	 effective	when	 faced	with	
some	 extreme	 forms	 of	 misconduct	 occurring	 in	 the	 official	 banking	 system,	 but	 totally	
inadequate	to	come	to	grips	with	the	grey	sector	of	the	financial	world	as	a	whole.		
	
The	notion	that	international	financial	markets	need	international	regulatory	tools	was	rejected	
because	 rules	 can	only	be	established	nationally	and	can	never	be	 totally	harmonised.	Where	
new	 rules	 were	 implemented,	 financial	 markets	 witnessed	 an	 exodus	 of	 traders	 from	 large	
banks	 to	 small	 hedge	 fund	 dealers,	 namely	 to	 the	 grey	 areas	 that	 contributed	 to	 the	 2008	
financial	 crisis.	 Finally,	 disappointment	 and	 fear	 on	 the	 part	 of	 savers	 is	 leading	 to	 emerging	
private	 firms	 (yet	 more	 grey	 banking)	 to	 offer	 unsolicited	 help,	 often	 hiding	 yet	 more	
speculative	or	fraudulent	purposes.		
	
The	lack	or	ineffectiveness	of	new	regulations	may	also	be	the	result	of	the	lack	of	substantial	
organised	and	 ideological	opposition	 to	market	philosophies,	whereby	policies	 continue	 to	be	
tailored	around	 the	needs	of	bankers	 rather	 than	 citizens.	The	global	 economy,	 in	brief,	 is	no	
longer	 subject	 to	 political	 control:	 on	 the	 contrary,	 it	 is	 politics	 that	 has	 placed	 itself	 at	 its	
service.	 Echoing	 a	 religious	 creed,	 the	 prevailing	 motto	 is:	 there	 is	 no	 salvation	 outside	 the	
market	 (Todorov	 2014).	 Against	 this	 ideological	 backdrop,	 licit	 or	 illicit	 financial	 operations,	
both	causing	social	harm,	may	be	destined	to	continue	undeterred	as	long	as	those	conducting	
them	 can	 claim	 that	 such	 operations	 benefit	 not	 themselves	 but	 markets,	 namely	 society	 at	
large.	 In	 this	 way,	 as	 Touraine	 (2014:	 74)	 has	 remarked,	 financiers	 can	 step	 outside	 the	
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framework	of	legality	and	enter	the	world	inhabited	by	‘drug	cartels,	arms	dealers	or	cigarette	
smugglers’,	 while	 their	 acts	 become	 ‘part	 of	 the	 powerful	 surge	 in	 an	 expanding	 illegal	
economy’.		
	
Whistleblowers	such	as	Hervè	Falciani,	the	employee	of	a	Swiss	bank	who	passed	clients’	details	
to	 tax	 investigators	 and	 personally	 to	 Christine	 Lagarde,	 head	 of	 the	 International	 Monetary	
Fund,	are	still	 in	danger	of	prosecution	(Associated	Press	2013).	In	the	UK,	 large	corporations	
continue	 to	 pay	 derisory	 amounts	 of	 tax	 despite	 their	 gigantic	 profits,	 tax	 incentives	 are	 still	
being	 offered	 to	 foreign	 companies	with	 a	 view	 to	 attracting	 foreign	 investment,	 and	 this	 tax	
competition	 is	 triggering	 a	 race	 to	 the	 bottom	 which	 contributes	 to	 making	 the	 boundaries	
between	white	collar	and	organised	crime	 increasingly	blurred.	This	 is	 the	result	of	 increased	
corporate	 tax	 competition	 among	 states	 (Farnsworth	 and	 Fooks	 2015),	 whereby	 large	
companies	 continue	 to	 be	 the	 biggest	 ‘welfare	 queens’,	 and	 tax	 breaks,	 grants,	 loans	 and	
subsidies	constitute	what	can	be	termed	‘corporate	welfare’.	Corporate	theft	and	fraud	continue	
undeterred,	 while	 pensions	 providers	 prove	 impervious	 to	 government	 threats	 (Sikka	 2013;	
Tombs	 2013).	With	 risk	 operations	 still	 prevailing,	 and	 with	 the	 self‐assurance	 of	 operators	
denying	such	risks,	it	is	not	just	‘waste’	being	produced	but	a	dynamic	leading	to	the	infection	of	
the	whole	financial	system	(Skidelsky	and	Skidelshy	2012).	
	
Conclusion	
There	is	no	contemporary	Solon	in	view:	that	is	to	say	there	is	no	novel	democratic	arrangement	
supervising	the	financial	world	and	making	sure	its	operation	are	fair.	Regulation	in	one	area	of	
the	 financial	 system	encourages	deregulation	 in	 another,	 as	we	have	 seen,	 and	 the	 growth	of	
hidden	networks	of	business	may	well	be	the	result	of	recent	legislative	efforts	in	the	UK.	This	
growth	may	 in	 fact	 offer	 organised	 criminals	novel	opportunities.	The	 claim	 that	markets	 are	
adaptive	 and	 self‐regulating	 accompanies	 a	 perverse	 process	 whereby	 regulation	 pushes	
deregulation,	 thus	 expanding	 the	 areas	 in	 which	 all	 actors,	 legitimate	 or	 otherwise,	 will	 be	
regaled	with	unexpected	chances	to	engage	in	crime.	The	following	example	is	indicative	of	the	
bleak	 future	 ahead:	 HSBC,	 Britain’s	 biggest	 bank,	 agreed	 to	 pay	 a	 record	 £1.2bn	 to	 settle	
allegations	 that	 it	 allowed	 terrorist	 organisations	 and	 drugs	 traffickers	 to	 move	 billions	 of	
dollars	around	the	financial	system	(Rushe	and	Treanor	2012).		
	
The	 financial	 sector	 is	not	only	 the	 leading	mega‐machine	 that	accumulates	and	maximises	 in	
the	form	of	capital	the	values	that	can	be	extracted	from	the	highest	possible	number	of	human	
beings	and	echo‐systems.	 It	 is	also	 the	 locus	where	 the	elite	 forges	connections	and	networks	
and	where	the	constant	movement	from	one	occupational	group	to	the	other	is	promoted.	The	
financial	world	displays	the	sedimentation	of	partnerships,	alliances,	solidarity	and	complicity	
among	representatives	of	formally	different	spheres.	It	is	constituted	by	a	social	space	hosting	
lawyers,	 legislators,	politicians,	entrepreneurs	and	other	elitist	professionals	who	amalgamate	
their	values	and	forge	their	ethical	allegiances	(Ruggiero	2015).	Whoever	tries	to	get	in	the	way	
of	 this	mega‐machine	 is	 reminded,	as	did	Tony	Blair	 (2005),	 that	all	 regulatory	measures	are	
‘hugely	 inhibiting	 of	 efficient	 business	 by	 perfectly	 respectable	 companies	 that	 have	 never	
defrauded	anyone’.	
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1	This	article	draws	on	research	funded	by,	and	a	report	produced	for,	 the	European	Commission.	The	project	 title	
was	'Tackling	Illegal	Economies'.	
2	In	finance,	leverage	is	a	general	term	for	any	technique	to	multiply	gains.	Most	often	this	involves	buying	more	of	an	
asset	by	using	borrowed	funds.	The	belief	is	that	the	income	from	the	asset	will	exceed	the	cost	of	borrowing.	As	the	
2008	 crisis	 demonstrates,	 this	 involves	 the	 risk	 that	 borrowing	 will	 be	 larger	 than	 the	 income	 from	 the	 asset,	
causing	loss	or	even	collapse.	
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